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Technical standards and product regulations increasingly shape 
international trade patterns, the organization of cross-national production, 
and global investment flows.
1  This paper examines the evolution of 
international market regulation in the pharmaceutical- and cosmetics 
industries over the past three decades. International market regulation of 
pharmaceuticals and cosmetics poses an intriguing empirical puzzle.  Both 
industries have seen the emergence and subsequent institutionalization of 
international market regulation over the last three decades.  In similar 
ways, the mode of international governance has shifted over time in both 
cases – from occasional international spill-over of domestic rules to 
deliberate extraterritorial imposition of domestic laws to transgovernmental 
cooperation aimed at international harmonization.  Yet against this 
background of commonality, we find a sharp divergence in the sectors 
when it comes to who exerts most influence: in the case of 
pharmaceuticals, the United States has long been dominant and has only 
recently seen its leadership challenged by the European Union; in 
cosmetics, by contrast, the EU has shaped international market regulation 
from the outset and the US has failed, repeatedly, to make significant 
inroads. What explains the similar institutional evolution of international 
market regulation in the two fields and the sharp divergence in terms of 
policy influence between them? 
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Technical standards and product regulations increasingly shape international trade 
patterns, the organization of cross-national production, and global investment flows.
1  
This paper examines the evolution of international market regulation in the 
pharmaceutical- and cosmetics industries over the past three decades. International 
market regulation of pharmaceuticals and cosmetics poses an intriguing empirical 
puzzle.  Both industries have seen the emergence and subsequent institutionalization of 
international market regulation over the last three decades.  In similar ways, the mode of 
international governance has shifted over time in both cases – from occasional 
international spill-over of domestic rules to deliberate extraterritorial imposition of 
domestic laws to transgovernmental cooperation aimed at international harmonization.   
 
Yet against this background of commonality, we find a sharp divergence in the sectors 
when it comes to who exerts most influence: in the case of pharmaceuticals, the United 
States has long been dominant and has only recently seen its leadership challenged by 
the European Union; in cosmetics, by contrast, the EU has shaped international market 
regulation from the outset and the US has failed, repeatedly, to make significant 
inroads. What explains the similar institutional evolution of international market 
regulation in the two fields and the sharp divergence in terms of policy influence 
between them? 
 
We argue that a key to understanding international patterns of interaction – the mode of 
governance and locus of influence – lies in the sequential development of domestic 
regulatory capacity in leading markets.  Regulatory capacity is the ability of a 
jurisdiction to define and implement a set of market rules, and to monitor firms’ 
compliance with them.  The extent of a jurisdiction’s regulatory capacity is largely 
institutionally-determined.  It depends on the number and expertise of staff, the extent 
of statutory sanctioning authority vested in regulators, and the degree of centralization 
of regulatory authority over a market.
2  Jurisdictions with such regulatory capacity are 
best positioned to project regulatory authority, even beyond their borders if necessary, 
and can thereby shape international market rules. 
 
Regulatory capacity varies across countries, sectors, and time relative to one another.  
Disparities in regulatory capacity among leading markets in a given moment in time are 
therefore quite possible.  Like other institutional characteristics of a political economy – 
such as the financial system, corporate governance, or industrial organization – it is the 
product of political processes slowly unfolding over time, occasionally even stretching 
back as far as the era of state- and nation-building.
3  Policymakers confronted with new 
regulatory challenges in the face of globalizing markets must rely on the institutional 
resources at their disposal, and these usually predate the particular challenge at hand.  
Jurisdictions can consciously decide to build-up domestic regulatory capacity.  For 
instance, industry liberalization, such as in the case of financial markets or 
telecommunication, has been associated with a conscious and marked increase in 
regulatory capacity in many countries.
4  But such build-up does not happen over-night.  
                                                 
1 See Raustiala 1997, Vogel and Kagan 2004 and Mattli and Büthe 2003. 
2 This argument draws on historical institutional work such as Zysman 1994 and Thelen 2004.  It builds 
on work from the domestic setting on bureaucratic autonomy, such as Carpenter 2001 and Goodman 
1991.  For a recent elaboration in the international setting see Bach and Newman 2007. 
3 For the importance of time in causal processes see Pierson 2004 and Büthe 2002.  




The relative sequential development of domestic regulatory capacity thus critically 
shapes patterns of interaction in international market regulation.
5  
 
Employing the relative sequencing argument, we construct a deductive causal typology, 
which offers testable expectations about the likelihood of transgovernmental 
cooperation, extraterritorial application of domestic law, or market governance. Robust 
transgovernmental cooperation requires capable and domestically-empowered 
regulators in all the pivotal markets.  A highly asymmetric distribution of regulatory 
capacity across major markets means international market regulation has to proceed 
through alternative governance modes.  Extraterritorial application of domestic rules by 
the regulatory hegemon is a common form of international market regulation in such 
instances.
6  In this case, rather than just controlling market access via product standards, 
the hegemon imposes its domestic production process proscriptions on foreign 
producers seeking market access.  Lastly, if no jurisdiction has highly-developed 
regulatory capacity in a sector or those with regulatory capacity choose not to exercise 
it, pure market coordination prevails internationally.  This is the case for new markets at 




The paper makes contributions to two critical debates in International Relations.  First, 
it pushes the discussion about the relationship between domestic institutions and 
international cooperation beyond formal negotiations that take place in the context of 
traditional liberal intergovernmental bargains.
8  Most existing work has focused on the 
role that domestic institutions play when national legislatures are required to ratify 
international deals.
9  In an increasing number of instances, this is not the case, as 
regulators and other substate actors directly engage in international affairs.  Secondly, 
the paper expands on a growing literature concerned with transgovernmental relations.  
While researchers have demonstrated the ability of such actors to resolve a number of 
complex global governance challenges
10, there is limited work that predicts the 
likelihood of transgovernmental cooperation.  Transposing historical institutionalist 
tools, particularly the importance of sequencing and the development of institutional 
capacity, to the international context we think can push forward these debates. 
 
This paper is organized as follows.  The first section gives a brief overview of 
international market regulation in pharmaceuticals and cosmetics.  It describes the 
surprisingly similar institutional evolution in both sectors and highlights critical 
difference in terms of the locus of influence between them.  Section two examines 
existing systemic theories of International Relations, emphasizing market size and 
market friction. Section three sketches a domestic institutional argument that relates 
changing patterns of interaction in international market regulation to the sequential 
development of domestic regulatory capacity in leading markets, principally the US and 
Europe.  In the paper’s empirical core, we evaluate the expectations of the three 
approaches through process-tracing.  Whereas expectations of existing theories are not 
or only partially reflected by the evidence, we find that the historical sequence of 
                                                 
5 See Newman 2008. 
6 See, for example, Fox 1997.  
7 See Spar 2001. 
8 See Frieden and Martin 2002. 
9 See Putnam 1988 and Milner 1997. 




domestic institutional change has indeed shaped patterns of interaction of international 
market regulation in the expected way. The final section discusses the relevance of the 
findings for the field of international political economy and draws conclusions for the 
research program put forth in this special issue. 
 
INTERNATIONAL MARKET REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS 
Before entering into the casual debate concerning drivers of international market 
regulation, we begin with an overview highlighting changing patterns of international 
interaction.  While both sectors experience a layering of extraterritorial efforts and 
transgovernmental cooperation, the pharmaceutical sector begins with US dominance. 
 
Drug safety and -efficacy have been the motivating drivers of domestic pharmaceutical 
regulation around the world.  The onset of formal domestic pharmaceutical regulation 
can be dated to the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act in the United States.  During the 19
th 
century, the manufacture and marketing of medicines and health products had been 
largely a local, artisan affair that was entirely unregulated.  Patients took medicines at 
their own risk.  Scientific breakthroughs in medicine, the industrial chemicals 
revolution, and the prospect of mass production and -distribution considerably increased 
the stakes.  The 1906 Act gave the government a broad mandate to protect consumers 
by assessing drug safety.  In 1938, during the height of the New Deal, Congress 
delegated authority over the industry to the Food and Drug Administration, an 
independent regulatory agency.  To carry out this mandate, the FDA has asserted 
authority up and down the value chain, from regulating clinical trials and 
pharmaceutical manufacturing to supervising drug marketing and advertising.   
Furthermore, the broad mandate has led the FDA to extend its reach overseas: not only 
must foreign producers meet all domestic market access requirements, the FDA also 
conducts inspections of overseas manufacturing facilities if these produce for US 
consumers.
11     
 
The motivating drivers of international market regulation build on existing domestic 
foundations.  As markets have become more integrated, concern has shifted to ensuring 
safety across jurisdictions – increasingly drugs are developed in one jurisdiction, 
produced in another, and marketed in a third.  To this has been added a dual concern 
with regulatory efficiency.  On the one hand side, pharmaceutical companies demand 
international regulatory harmonization to reduce transactions costs.  The industry has 
become global yet regulation still requires independent national drug approval, often 
according to different rules and with incompatible procedures.  Secondly, industry 
globalization has fostered competition between jurisdictions when it comes to the 
quality, speed, and cost of approval processes.
12     
 
The mode of governance in international pharmaceutical markets has shifted markedly 
over time.  Initially, international governance consisted largely of the extraterritorial 
application of US law.  Over time governance has moved toward transgovernmental 
cooperation.  Nevertheless, domestic rules promulgated by leading regulators in the US, 
Europe, and also Japan continue to constitute key elements of international market 
regulation.  Importantly, traditional international organizations have not played a 
                                                 
11 See Vogal 1998 and Lee and Herzstein 1986. 




prominent role, apart from some OECD-sponsored conferences touting the benefits of 
harmonization.
13   
 
Starting in the 1990s, regulators including the FDA have forged bilateral partnerships 
codified in Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) to promote technical information 
sharing and coordination.  In parallel, regulators from the US, Europe, and Japan 
launched the International Conference on Harmonization (ICH) to standardize testing 
and laboratory practices across the world’s largest markets.  According to one observer, 
“The accomplishments of the ICH have been impressive.  Nearly sixty ICH Topics have 
become official Guidelines and reached the implementation stage as of 2003, meaning a 
harmonized text has been approved by all parties, including all three regulatory 
agencies.  Many of these Guidelines pertain to uncontroversial matters in which much 
international agreement already existed.  However, some represent meaningful progress 
in achieving harmonization.”
14  Examples of the latter category include common 
definitions of such issues as toxicity tests and clean laboratories.  However, these efforts 
did not include a process for joint market approval.  Separately, EU and US 
policymakers have sought to go further, concluding a Mutual Recognition Agreement 
(MRA) in 1997 that would have regulators certify some of their counterparts’ 
evaluation procedures and thus lead to limited mutual recognition.  Even though FDA 
resistance has largely stalled mutual recognition, transgovernmental cooperation among 
the world’s leading regulators has become a fixture of international pharmaceutical 
markets regulation.   
 
The locus of influence in international market regulation of pharmaceuticals has 
changed considerably over the past three decades.  Until the 1990s, the US was the 
sector’s undisputed regulatory hegemon.  From very early on, the US had relied on a 
powerful, independent regulatory agency that governed pharmaceuticals primarily by 
controlling market access.  Throughout the post-war period and into the 1990s, the FDA 
was the undisputed international regulatory reference point and source of best practices.  
“The FDA has long provided the public health gold standard for the world,” said FDA 
Commissioner Jane E. Henney in 2001.
15  Because the agency was unrelenting in its 
insistence that any drug – no matter who produced it or where – that was to be marketed 
in the US had to go through the same grueling approval protocol as domestically-
produced drugs, many foreign producers experienced the FDA’s professionalism and 
meticulousness first-hand.  Most feared the mighty FDA a great deal more than their 
own domestic regulators.
16   
 
Since the 1990s, however, there has been a clear shift toward a much more balanced 
situation.  While the FDA continues to exert considerable influence over the 
international regulatory agenda, the European Commission, and to a lesser extent the 
Japanese Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare, have become powerful voices.  The 
big three dominate standard-setting and enforcement.  It is the national regulators of 
these three markets that control market access, organize and control transgovernmental 
cooperation, and set the pharmaceuticals-related agenda of international organizations.  
                                                 
13 The only notable exception is intellectual property law, where the WTO – through the TRIPS 
Agreement – has imposed patent protection for pharmaceuticals rooted in US and European law on its 
more than 130 members. 
14 Lee 2005, 179-80. 
15 Biomedical Market Newsletter, 31 January, 11. 




While the FDA has adopted some of the practices of its European counterparts, 
incorporating user fees and recognizing some foreign trials, it has resisted more 
comprehensive convergence.  At the same time, the European Commission has become 
an equal player in standard setting debates in the ICH.
17   
 
 
INTERNATIONAL MARKET REGULATION OF COSMETICS 
The motivation and public policy justification for cosmetics regulation closely 
resembles core elements of the pharmaceuticals regime.  The principal focus is also 
product safety and the protection of consumers.  As cosmetics generally do not have 
medical applications, their effectiveness is less of a public policy concern.  Just as in the 
case of pharmaceuticals, however, globalization and market integration have generated 
business pressure on governments to reduce transactions costs through regulatory 
harmonization.  
 
The institutional evolution of international cosmetics regulation mirrors the parallel case 
of pharmaceuticals.  Domestic regulation, often with extraterritorial reach, constitutes a 
first important pillar of governance.  The EU in particular has enacted binding 
regulation for the sector that strictly regulates which ingredients are acceptable, 
restricted, or outright prohibited through positive and negative ingredient lists.  In the 
US, in contrast, cosmetics (with the exception of colorants) that are not classified as 
over-the-counter (OTC) drugs fall under a self-regulatory scheme set up and run by 
industry.   
 
Mirroring pharmaceuticals, transgovernmental cooperation between domestic regulatory 
agencies has emerged alongside unilateralism.  Regulators from four leading markets – 
the US, Japan, Canada, and the EU – engage in information sharing under the 
Cosmetics Harmonization and International Cooperation (CHIC) framework.  Meetings 
have taken place three times since 1999.  The group initially focused on the exchange of 
information about their respective regulatory approaches, safety concerns, and 
alternative testing methods.  Initiatives currently under discussion include the 
establishment of an international rapid alert system to enhance consumer protection.  
This process produced minimal results and was considered defunct until the recent 
reinvigoration in 2007 with the start of the International Cooperation on Cosmetics 
Regulation between the major market regulators.  At the same time, the European 
Commission and the FDA have agreed to a bilateral exchange of letters whereby the 
two agencies pledge to share information concerning draft legislation, market defects, 
scientific opinions, and inspection reports. When compared to transgovernmental 
cooperation in pharmaceuticals and especially to banking or securities regulation, 
regulator cooperation in the cosmetics field is rather limited.  Interestingly, more 
established international organizations such as the WTO and WHO have been 
sidestepped in favor of transgovernmental efforts.  And these transgovernmental efforts 




Despite similarities in the mode of governance, in terms of the locus of influence the 
two sectors sharply diverge.  In cosmetics, Europe is the undisputed international 
regulatory hegemon.  Mercosur countries including Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and 
                                                 
17 See Kidd 1996-1997 and Kulynych 1999. 




Uruguay have all adopted legislation in the late 1990s that includes the European 
definition of cosmetics and that empowers regulatory agencies to oversee positive and 
negative lists.  The ten members of ASEAN adopted legislation in 2003 that essentially 
copies European rules.  ASEAN countries directly imported Annex II of the European 
directive, which includes the positive and negative ingredient lists maintained by the 
EU, into binding local regulation.  Japan reformed its legislation in 2001 and moved 
towards the European model.  Similarly, the state of California enacted tough legislation 
in 2006 inspired by European rules. Lastly, in 2007, China formally banned many 
substances on the European negative list.     
 
In contrast to some of the other major non-EU markets, the US has so far resisted 
European convergence pressure.  This does not mean that EU regulations have not 
affected US cosmetics firms or cosmetics firms operating in the US.  Compliance with 
EU regulations is a prerequisite for entering the lucrative EU markets as well as a 
growing number of markets in Latin America and Asia.  Many US firms have found it 
cheaper to adopt EU standards throughout their global operations rather than producing 
products with different compositions for different markets.  Moreover, in a few cases 
where cosmetics firms refused to remove ingredients in products for the US market 
even though these had been banned in Europe, US consumer organizations mobilized 
and eventually forced product changes for the US market as well.
19  The EU has thus 
extended its de-facto regulatory reach around the world, including to the US 
 
The Empirical Puzzle 
The evolution of international market regulation in both pharmaceuticals and cosmetics 
poses a puzzle for IPE scholars.  The patterns of interaction in the two sectors have 
changed considerably over the past three decades, both in terms of mode of governance 
and in terms of locus of influence.  In both cases we see a gradual evolution of 
international market regulation, driven initially by the extraterritorial application of 
domestic rules, i.e. the deliberate exercise of authority outside of a jurisdiction’s 
physical borders.  The FDA took the lead in pharmaceuticals and ensured that foreign 
producers met strict US safety norms and standards, not just for the products themselves 
but also regarding drug development and production.  Conversely, in the cosmetics 
case, Europe has asserted influence and has extended the de-facto reach of European 
regulation far beyond the continent.  In both cases, unidirectional regulatory exports are 
being complemented with transgovernmental regulatory cooperation, i.e. direct 
interaction among sub-state units in semi-autonomous fashion from their national 
executive.  
 
How can we explain the changing patterns of interaction in both sectors?  What explains 
the remarkably similar evolution of international market regulation from extraterritorial 
application of national law to transgovernmental cooperation?  And why do the two 
cases diverge so sharply when it comes to who has exerted most influence over policy?  
In the pharmaceutical case, a long period of US regulatory hegemony is slowly giving 
way to a more balanced situation as the EU has begun to assert influence.  In cosmetics, 
in contrast, Europe has been and remains the undisputed regulatory hegemon.  What 
explains this sharp empirical divergence in two closely-related industries? 
 
 
                                                 
19 See Laurel Naversen Geraghty, “Should You Worry About the Chemicals in Your Makeup?,” The New 




EXPECTATIONS OF EXISTING THEORIES: MARKET SIZE OR MARKET 
FRICTION 
Before presenting our model of comparative institutional sequencing, we derive relevant 
expectations from the two dominant theories used to explain patterns of international 
economic governance.  After the presentation of the theoretical expectations of existing 
approaches and our own argument, we use the historical narratives as a process tracing 
exercise to test the usefulness of the competing causal mechanisms.  As the outcome of 
interest – patterns of interaction – is not disputed, the focus of the paper concerns the 
alternative causal claims that might have produced the outcome. 
 
Market Size 
Realist theories of international cooperation and international political economy focus 
attention on the decisive role of state power.
20  Recently, scholars have applied realist 
thinking to the field of international market regulation.
21  Power here is taken to be 
market power, which is usually operationalized through a focus on market size.  As 
Drezner  explains, “[s]tates are differentiated by their relative power” and “[p]ower is 
defined as the relative size and diversity of an actor’s internal market.”  According to 
realists, dominant powers – those with the largest markets relative to others – should be 
able to decisively shape international market rules, either through extraterritorial reach 
or within international bodies.  Shifts in the locus of influence should reflect changes in 
relative market size.
22  As such, the US, EU, and Japan, which have the largest markets 
in both sectors, should be the pivotal players.  But beyond the expectation that the major 
markets should drive international market policy, the theory is indeterminate.   
Assuming a more or less equitable distribution of market power among the major 
markets, the most likely result from a realist perspective would be rival regulations 
promoted by the respective camps. 
 
In terms of the mode of governance, realist theory does not make a clear prediction.  
Recent work by Drezner suggests that a hegemon may look to non-traditional actors to 
obtain outcomes that they themselves find costly to achieve.  Ultimately, 
transgovernmental networks are expected to serve the dominant powers’ national 
interests.  But that merely raises the question why dominant powers would prefer one 
mode of governance to another.  There is no clear expectation that explains a shift from 
extraterritorial application of national laws to transgovernmental cooperation.  Realist 
theory, then, offers clearer expectations concerning the locus of influence as opposed to 
modes of governance. 
 
Market Friction 
Functionalist theories of international cooperation in a liberal tradition stress the 
underlying collective action problems, externalities, and inefficiencies that generate 
demand for international regimes.
23  States, in turn, supply regimes to reduce transaction 
costs associated with international interdependence.  The states that experience the most 
inefficiencies from the system are, then, most likely to press for and shape cooperation.  
 
The mode of governance will reflect the underlying collective action problem with 
greater centralization and delegation as transaction costs increase.  Among the most 
                                                 
20 See Krasner 1976, Krasner 1991. 
21 See Drezner 2007. 
22 See Aggarwal 1985, James and Lake 1989, Shambaugh 1996. 




important functions performed by international regimes are the provision of information 
and the facilitation of credible commitments by participating states.
24  The effective 
provision of information often requires the creation of a centralized coordination body, 
such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).  But if 
information provision alone is the goal, no formal independence from participating 
states is necessary.  However, if the institution is also to help states make credible 
commitments, it must have a measure of independence from its members, such as, for 
example, the World Trade Organization (WTO).  Networks, by contrast, tend to be 
informal, voluntary, and decentralized.  
 
The theory expects that given high levels of international interdependence states would 
seek institutional means to share information, promote reciprocal learning, and foster 
consensus driven harmonization. In the case of international market regulation, where 
firms confront disparate national regulations across markets, states with large and 
diverse export markets suffer the greatest burden.  States should have little incentive to 
invest in international cooperation where national firms focus primarily on the domestic 
market and the country is primarily an import market.  They have the luxury to free ride 
on the efforts of those suffering the greatest transaction costs. 
 
The institutional form chosen performs the required functions at the lowest cost.   
Network-based transgovernmental cooperation, for example, would be most likely when 
there is demand for information provision and coordination but no need for a strong 
hierarchy that could make a mutual commitment credible.
25  A lack of cooperation, in 
turn, would suggest that any benefits of reduced transaction costs are outweighed by 
other costs.  If, in such cases, transactions costs are sufficiently high to render pure 
market coordination inefficient, states might try to apply domestic rules 
extraterritorially.  
  
Figure 1: Expectations of Existing Theories 
  Realism Liberalism 
Mode of 
Governance 
determined by preferences of 
dominant power(s) 
determined by nature of collective 




determined by distribution of 
power, which is reflected in 
relative market size 
determined by relative transaction 





REGULATORY CAPACITY, SEQUENCING, AND INTERNATIONAL 
MARKET REGULATION 
Building on historical institutionalist tools, we derive an alternative causal logic to 
explain evolving patterns of interaction based on the relative sequential development of 
domestic regulatory capacity in leading markets.  Regulatory capacity is a jurisdiction’s 
ability to define, monitor, and enforce a set of domestic market rules.  It encompasses 
                                                 
24 See Abbott and Snidal 1988. 




the institutions that implement regulations, the expertise of staff working for these 
institutions, and the overarching coordination of such institutions within the political 
economy.  Clearly, regulatory capacity can vary across sectors and policy areas.  A 
jurisdiction’s regulatory institutions may be well-developed in the field of banking 
regulation, for example, but weak in competition policy or utilities regulation.  And like 
all institutions in a political economy, regulatory institutions develop over time and 
relative to other political and institutional developments, at home and abroad.  Let us 
first elaborate the concept of regulatory capacity and explain how it bears on 
international market regulation, and then turn to sequencing. 
 
Regulatory Capacity 
International market regulation is rooted in domestic institutions.  Jurisdictions build 
regulatory regimes for domestic markets over time.  In doing so they draw on available 
institutional resources and patterns.
26  Fundamental characteristics of political economy, 
such as the nature of state-society relations or the administrative capacity of the state 
that are rooted in historical trajectories of state- and nation-building, come to shape the 
institutional configuration of domestic market regulation.
27  This does not mean that 
regulatory capacity does not change.  The American progressive era, for example, saw a 
considerable expansion of regulatory capacity, especially on the federal level.
28  
Similarly, the rise of the regulatory state around the world has considerably augmented 
regulatory capacity in many sectors.
29  But such changes are generally quite slow.
30 
When regulators confront new challenges at T=1, they must usually do so with 
institutional resources developed at T=0.  With respect to international market 
regulation this means that regulators initially confronted the challenges posed by 
globalization and market integration with regulatory tools developed for domestic 
settings.  Only over time have domestic institutional reforms altered the tools for 
international market regulation. 
 
Regulatory capacity is a multidimensional construct interlinked through a set of 
institutional complementarities.
31  A jurisdiction’s regulatory capacity in a given 
industry and point in time depends on its regulatory expertise, the coherence of 
regulation, and the extent of the regulator’s sanctioning authority.  To be effective, 
regulators need the staff and technical expertise to identify new challenges and to 
formulate and implement countervailing regulatory strategies.  Regulatory authority 
also has to be coherent.  Institutional fragmentation and/or poor coordination among 
regulatory sub-units undermines a jurisdiction’s regulatory capacity.  Lastly, regulatory 
capacity depends on the extent of a regulator’s statutory sanctioning authority.   
Sanctioning tools range from public shaming through fines all the way to formal market 
exclusion.  All else equal, regulators that are institutionally empowered to exclude from 





                                                 
26 See Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985. 
27 See Hall 1986, Zysman 1983. 
28 See Skowronek 1982. 
29 See Moran 2002. 
30 See Thelen 2004. 





The importance of regulatory capacity is that it is the missing link between market size 
and international regulatory influence.
32  A sizeable market alone does not confer 
regulatory influence.  To wield international influence, jurisdictions need capable and 
powerful domestic regulators that can identify new challenges posed by globalization, 
formulate countervailing strategies, and enforce rules where necessary even against 
foreign opposition.  Jurisdictions with large markets rely on their institutional resources 
to make demands on foreign jurisdictions.  Those foreign jurisdictions, in turn, make 
domestic adjustments when perceived costs of resisting are greater than the cost of 
adjustment.  Internationally influential domestic regulators must be institutionally 
empowered to punish foreign failures to adjust.  Sanctioning tools range from exacting 
reputational costs associated with condemnation through official administrative fines all 
the way to exclusion from the domestic market.  The size of the domestic market thus 
matters a great deal because it determines the extent of potential resistance costs.  It 
does not determine the actual cost of non-adjustment, however, because the probability 
of sanctioning is not given by market size but rather by the credible threat of discovery 
and enforcement. The critical variable in the influence equation is thus the foreign 
jurisdiction’s perception of the demand-making regulator’s ability to monitor and 
punish inaction, a political institutional – as opposed to purely economic – variable.
33  
 
In contrast to our predictions, research applying the Schelling Conjecture to 
international negotiations has argued that internal fragmentation strengthens a 
jurisdiction’s international bargaining position.
34  The threat of domestic veto ties the 
hands of the international negotiator.  This work, however, assumes that international 
negotiators, in the context of liberal intergovernmental agreements, face a domestic 
ratification requirement.  They may then use the ratification requirement to tie their 
hands and force compromise.  In international market regulation, by contrast, formal 
negotiations with ratification requirements are rare.
35  Rather, states proceed through 
transgovernmental cooperation or react to extra-territorial application of national laws.  
In both cases, the domestic regulator is simultaneously the international actor, 
collapsing the 2-level game metaphor.  In these cases, it is the ability to provide a 
coherent first move or send a knowledgeable expert to the table that produces results 
both of which require significant regulatory capacity. 
 
Domestic regulatory capacity develops over time, but it does so unevenly across 
jurisdictions.  This produces a relative sequencing dynamic that profoundly shapes 
patterns of interaction in international market regulation.
36  Interjurisdictional 
unevenness, which is not uncommon, can be dubbed the “Kissinger Effect.”  As US 
Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger underscored transatlantic asymmetry resulting from 
insufficient political integration in the Old World: “Who do I call if I want to call 
Europe?,” he asked succinctly.  Similar asymmetries also profoundly affect international 
market regulation.  If there is no institutionally-empowered counterpart to negotiate 
with, regulators in leading markets may have little choice but to apply domestic rules 
extraterritorially in order to safeguard the domestic status quo in the face of market 
                                                 
32 See Bach and Newman 2007, Newman 2008. 
33 See North and Weingast 1989. 
34 See Meunier 2005, Putnam 1988 
35 See Knopf 1993 and  Büthe 2007. 
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globalization.  Domestic early adopters thus often have a first-mover advantage when it 
comes to substantive international market rules, though they may be faced with the 
difficult task of unilaterally setting and especially enforcing rules.
37   
 
The logic of relative sequencing implies that a first-mover advantage may not last 
forever.  Follower jurisdictions may develop their own regulatory capacity.  This can 
occur as an unintended consequence of domestic regulatory reform, or as a deliberate 
response to the first-mover’s international assertion of authority.  In either case, the 
expansion of regulatory capacity in a key follower jurisdiction is a necessary condition 
for the development of more formal transgovernmental cooperation.  International 
market regulation thus evolves, as transgovernmental cooperation complements or 
displaces unilateral moves.  If both leading markets have insufficient regulatory 
capacity or are otherwise unwilling to assume an international role, pure market 
coordination prevails.   Figure 1 summarizes the expected effects of the distribution of 
regulatory capacity on the form of international market regulation. 
 
Figure 1: Domestic Regulatory Capacity and International Market Regulation 
    A’s Regulatory Capacity 
   Low  High 
B’s Regulatory Capacity 









But why would a regulatory first-mover even consider sharing authority and engaging 
in cooperation?  There are two reasons.  First, governing internationalizing markets via 
extraterritorial application of domestic rules is costly and often inefficient.  Costs occur 
both in terms of monitoring and, more importantly, in terms of business lobbies pushing 
for greater harmonization and less market friction.  Secondly, the follower jurisdiction – 
now drawing on its own regulatory capacity – can make costly demands on the initial 
first-mover.  It can push its own rules extraterritorially, for instance.  Power in 
international market regulation can thus be usefully thought of as the ability to 
unilaterally shift the reversion point for international bargaining.  The reversion point 
describes the set of international market rules that prevail in the absence of a new 
international agreement.
38 Domestic regulators that acquire new competencies – 
competencies that enable them to unilaterally change aspects of the international market 
environment – wield additional influence in formal or informal international bargaining.  
 
The domestic institutional argument leads to the following expectations about 
international market regulation.  The domestic institutional status quo in leading 
markets just prior to the onset of international market regulation strongly shapes broad 
institutional contours of international governance in a sector.  If regulatory state-type 
institutions existed, we should expect domestic regulatory agencies to play leading roles 
in any evolving international regime.  Pronounced asymmetry of domestic regulatory 
regimes in terms of institutional design and/or regulatory capacity – the “Kissinger 
Effect” – skews international governance towards unilateral mechanisms and hinders 
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sustained international cooperation.  Institutional reform in follower states, however, 
can make the international distribution of regulatory capacity less lopsided and thus 
enable transgovernmental cooperation.  
 
Relative sequencing also affects who gets to shape the initial international regulatory 
agenda.  A regulatory first-mover with the ability to unilaterally shift the reversion 
point can obtain critical leverage over the evolving regime.  Beyond sequencing, a 
jurisdiction’s ability to promote its rules internationally depends on the extent of its 
domestic regulatory capacity.  The extent of regulatory expertise, coherence, and 
sanctioning authority determines a jurisdiction’s ability to monitor and enforce its 
rules, thus providing incentives for foreign adjustment.  This means that jurisdictions 
with greater regulatory capacity may be able to shape international market regulation 
even when there is relative parity in market size.  While existing arguments focusing on 
market size predict opposing camps and rival rules in the case of relative market parity, 
we argue that discrepancies in regulatory capacity can decidedly tilt the balance 
toward one camp.  This is because regulatory capacity can impose non-adjustment costs 
even on comparably large markets.  Regulatory hegemony may thus result despite 
preference conflicts among the dominant powers.   
 
In the following section, we trace the competing causal expectations highlighted above 
through the historical narrative of the two sectors. 
 
 
TRACING PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION 
From the onset of market globalization in the pharmaceutical industry and well into the 
1990s, the US was the dominant regulatory force in international markets.  Unwilling to 
even consider modifications of its strict domestic standards, US regulators frequently 
imposed their own rules extraterritorially on foreign producers.  The situation started to 
change in the 1990s, with both the mode of governance and the locus of influence 
shifting.  Extraterritorial imposition of US rules gradually gave way to regulatory 
cooperation among the US, EU, and Japan.  And after decades of near-hegemony in 
international pharmaceutical market regulation, Europe began to openly challenge US 
leadership.  Indeed, powerful US regulators for the first time have had to make 
meaningful concessions to foreign authorities.  How do the three principal explanations 
– realist, liberal, and domestic institutional – fare? 
 
Market Size 
Realists attribute broad contours of international regulatory regimes to the interests of 
dominant powers.  Power, in this context, generally refers to market power for which 
market size or global market share are frequently used as proxies (Drezner 2006).  The 
main focus of a realist inquiry is the locus of influence, i.e. who controls the policy 
agenda?  Institutional aspects of governance are secondary as these are assumed to be 
determined by the dominant powers’ interests and reflective of the underlying 
distribution of power.
39  Realists thus make straightforward predictions about the 
variables that should produce the empirical pattern described above: US regulatory 
hegemony into the 1990s was a reflection of US market dominance.  The gradual 
balancing of influence and onset of greater cooperation, in turn, should be due to an 
                                                 




underlying structural change in the market, away from US dominance and toward a 
more balanced distribution of market power. 
 
Surprisingly, the data for worldwide pharmaceutical sales and production tell a 
completely different story.  In 1990, the European Union accounted for 37.8 percent of 
the roughly €136 billion global market for pharmaceuticals.  The US was in second 
place with 31.1 percent.  In 2003, with the total market almost three times the size at 
€412 billion, the US now represented a whopping 49.1 percent compared to only 27.8 
percent in the post-enlargement EU.
40  Whereas the industry had grown in the preceding 
decade at an annual rate of 4.6 percent in Europe, US annual growth was more than 
double at 9.3 percent.  
 
A similarly perplexing pattern is shown by data on the location of research 
expenditures, a key indicator as much pharmaceutical regulation focuses precisely on 
procedures for drug research, development, and testing.  In 1990, the pharmaceutical 
industry spent about €8 billion on research and development in Europe as compared to 
only €5.3 in the US.  A decade later, the picture was completely reversed.  By 2001, the 
industry as a whole invested €26.4 billion in research and development in the US and a 
mere €18 billion in Europe. 
 
Despite intense market competition and industry consolidation, there has also been no 
fundamental change in the balance of power between US and European pharmaceutical 
firms.  In 1997, US firms accounted for 50.2 percent of global sales by the ten largest 
pharmaceutical firms, compared to 28.9 percent for firms incorporated in the EU.  These 
figures had risen to 51.4 percent for US firms and 32.7 percent for EU firms by 2002.   
 
In sum, US market power should have markedly increased over the principal period 
under investigation.  Rather than Europe catching up as far as market size is concerned 
and thus challenging US market hegemony, as the realist argument would suggest, we 
see the opposite: a balanced market picture with even a slight European edge in the 
early 1990s has given way to clear international market dominance by the US.  Instead 
of a close linear correlation of market size and regulatory influence as realist theory 
would suggest, we find an inverse relationship between the two principal variables.  
 
Market Frictions 
To explain international governance, liberal functionalists focus attention on the 
underlying inefficiencies and transaction costs that generate demand for international 
cooperation and international institutions.
41  Countries with the highest level of 
international interdependence in a given industry have the most to gain from 
international harmonization and are therefore expected to drive international 
cooperation.  Indeed, we find that the ten largest importers of pharmaceuticals are the 
US, Japan, and eight European countries.  These ten markets’ overall share of imports 
has steadily increased, from 50.9 percent in 1980 to 61.8 percent by 1990 and 63.3 
percent in 1999.  Similarly, the US and nine European countries are the ten largest 
pharmaceutical exporters, accounting for 76.4 percent of world pharmaceutical exports 
in 1980, 73.7 percent in 1990, and 79.8 percent in 1999.  Much pharmaceutical trade 
consequently occurs among the handful of leading markets.  During this period, overall 
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trade in pharmaceuticals has exploded, growing from a mere $5 billion in 1980 to 
almost $120 billion by 1999 in constant prices.
42 
 
At first sight, the data are consistent with the basic liberal explanation for international 
cooperation.  A handful of countries account for the lion’s share of pharmaceutical 
trade, both imports and exports, and these countries have been most active in 
international market regulation.  The economic stakes have also markedly increased, 
both in terms of absolute trade volumes and their importance relative to GDP: the share 
of pharmaceutical trade for the US, Germany, France, the UK, and Japan, for example, 
has more than doubled, from 0.2 percent of these five major economies’ GDP in 1980 to 
0.48 percent by 1999.  In light of the growing importance of pharmaceutical trade and 
the high level of interdependence among markets in the US, Europe, and Japan, it is 
clear that these markets have the most to gain economically from international 
regulatory harmonization. 
 
Despite these consistencies, a liberal account of international market regulation in 
pharmaceuticals centered on transactions costs and economic gains from harmonization 
leaves key pieces of the empirical puzzle unaddressed.  First, arguments stressing 
market friction and international interdependence cannot explain the shift from 
extraterritorial application of US law to transgovernmental cooperation.   
Interdependence has gradually increased, yet the shift in governance in the 1990s is 
comparatively sudden.  Liberals ordinarily attribute significant institutional change in 
governance to a change in the underlying collective action problem or externality that 
drives cooperation.  But it is not clear what functional change this could be in the case 
of pharmaceutical.  Secondly, the liberal argument does not shed light on the shifting 
locus of influence in international pharmaceutical regulation.  US hegemony has given 
way to a more balance transatlantic situation in which regulators from Europe and the 
US learn from one another, share information, and standardize procedures.  Thirdly, in 
light of the rapid growth of global pharmaceuticals markets and the persistent market 
friction stemming from continued regulatory heterogeneity, it is surprising that 
regulatory cooperation among major markets has remained fairly limited.  The US in 
particular has shown the least interest in harmonization, even though US firms are 




A third potential explanation for the empirical picture painted above focuses on the 
sequential development of regulatory capacity in the major markets.  The institutional 
development of domestic pharmaceutical market regulation has proceeded along very 
different paths in the US and Europe.  Whereas US regulators confronted the period of 
market globalization with considerable regulatory capacity – manifested by significant 
expertise, regulatory coherence, and sweeping powers –, their European counterparts 
acquired similar capacity much later.  In-between, transatlantic regulatory asymmetry 
prevailed, what we call the “Kissinger Effect”.  
 
The construction of powerful regulatory state-type institutions in the US began in the 
early part of the 20
th century.  The 1906 Food and Drug Acts gave the government a 
broad mandate to assess the safety of drugs and in 1938 Congress delegated authority to 
                                                 




carry out that task to the FDA, an independent regulatory agency.  The agency quickly 
and consciously built in-house technical expertise.  To carry out its mandate, the FDA 
got involved in many aspects of pharmaceutical research, -development, and –
marketing, including oversight of laboratory conditions, testing methods, human trial 
protocols, and post-market safety.  But its most fundamental task – and the principal 
source of its power – is its market gatekeeper function.  New drugs need FDA approval 
before they can be marketed, thus granting the agency sweeping market exclusion 
power.  With a single agency in charge counting on expert staff and sweeping market 
exclusion power, the FDA epitomizes extensive regulatory capacity.
43 
 
In contrast to the early, relatively quick development of considerable regulatory 
capacity in the US, most industrial countries lacked a formal regulatory regime well into 
the 1960s.  Britain and Germany, for example, relied on voluntary safety reporting 
systems run by the industry.  Companies and trade associations played the primary role 
in regulating product development and market entry, resulting in an informal, 
decentralized governance structure.  
 
These informal systems came under intense pressure after a series of public health 
scandals.  The thalidomide crisis of the early 1960s, in which a drug given primarily to 
pregnant women to combat morning sickness produced extreme birth defects, 
demonstrated the failure of informal drug approval regimes.  The drug had been 
developed by a German company and was marketed in many countries without testing 
for effects on the health of the fetus.  Over 8000 infants were affected globally.  In the 
US, however, the FDA had rejected market approval for the drug citing concern for the 
safety of fetuses.  The fallout from the scandal prompted both the UK and Germany to 
move toward the US model of formal governmental oversight by professional 
regulators, though the legislative reforms took decades to be fully implemented.  The 
sharp contrast between the two models’ performance helped establish the FDA as the 
undisputed global reference point for drug approval.
44 
 
If the thalidomide crisis had demonstrated the US model’s superiority, the 1970s and 
1980s saw a slow and barely noticeable shift in pharmaceutical regulation on opposite 
sides of the Atlantic.  Congress’ response to the thalidomide scare was to further expand 
the FDA’s regulatory authority.  Most importantly, it added efficacy to safety as a 
requirement for FDA drug approval.  It also expanded the protections given to 
participants in clinical trials, including informed consent for human subjects, and 
established mandatory reporting requirements for drug companies of adverse drug 
reactions.  While further strengthening US regulatory capacity, the unintended 
consequence of these reforms was a marked increase in the time needed to obtain US 
market approval.  Average drug development times in the US ballooned from 8.1 years 
in the 1960s to 14.2 years by the 1980s and much of the increase was attributable to the 
demands of more stringent regulation.
45  The onset of industry globalization in the 
1970s began to turn this into a political issue, as US drug makers increasingly felt 
cumbersome US regulation put them at a competitive disadvantage in integrating 
markets. 
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At the same time European countries accelerated the development of their own 
regulatory state-type institutions for pharmaceuticals.  The European Community 
entered the debate in 1965 in the immediate aftermath of the thalidomide crisis and 
adopted a directive that required the formalization of pharmaceutical market regulation.  
Implementation was left to member states, however, prompting the development of 
nationally-distinct regulatory systems.  What followed was a 30-years struggle to 
progressively harmonize and integrate European pharmaceutical regulation.  In 1975, 
the European Commission introduced a procedure enabling drug companies to submit 
regulatory approval in one member state to authorities in other member states.  While 
the initiative signaled the first step toward transnational pharmaceutical regulation, 
member states used multiple exemptions in the directive to stall implementation.  The 
transnationalization of regulation took another important step in 1983 when the 
Commission created a standing committee of national regulators, the Committee for 
Proprietary Medicinal Products (CPMP), planting the seeds for an eventual pan-
European pharmaceuticals regulator. Still, the European market remained fragmented 
among member state lines.  The Commission identified lack of regulatory 
harmonization as a principal obstacle to greater market integration and pushed for even 
greater centralization of regulatory authority.  A 1993 directive gave authority for the 
approval of innovative drugs to the CPMP, required national regulators to justify any 
deviation from a prior decision by another member state regulator, and created the 
European Agency for the Evaluation of Medical Products (EMEA, later renamed the 
European Medicines Agency, EMA).  The agency centralized regulatory expertise at the 
EU-level and became the institutional anchor for the CPMP network of national 
regulators.
46   
 
By the early 1990s, the regulatory structure of the European pharmaceutical sector had 
undergone two fundamental transformations.  First, informal industry-led governance 
had been replaced by formal regulatory state-type institutions at the national level.   
Secondly, the European Commission began to coordinate these consolidated regulatory 
institutions at the European level and increasingly centralized regulatory authority at the 
EU level.  The result was a marked increase in European regulatory capacity over 
pharmaceuticals.
47  The professionalization and cross-national coordination of 
regulation greatly expanded regulatory expertise.  Furthermore, Commission 
coordination and centralization of authority via CPMP and EMA boosted regulatory 
coherence, giving Europe a single voice.  Finally, the new institutions controlled access 
to the now-integrating European pharmaceutical market, a powerful source of 
international leverage. 
 
Sequencing and its International Implications  
The sequential development of regulatory capacity on opposite sides of the Atlantic fits 
with the observed evolution of international market regulation.  US international 
dominance into the 1990s stemmed from unrivalled US regulatory capacity in the 
industry.  During this period, the simplest response to the challenge of dissimilar 
national regulation amidst market integration was the extraterritorial application of US 
law.  Yet market integration exposed US firms to foreign approval systems, many of 
which had improved considerably since the 1960s while maintaining quick approval 
times.  A major reason was that industry associations continued to play important roles 
in Europe and Japan.  Moreover, non-US regulators charged evaluation fees to 
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outsource aspects of drug evaluation to private contractors.  In the US in contrast, the 
FDA continued to rely exclusively on in-house experts, slowing down the process and 
making it increasingly bureaucratic.  The difference between the systems became a 
political issue in the 1980s when US drug makers decried a “drug lag” which they 
claimed challenged their international competitiveness.  The result was growing 
pressure on the FDA to abandon unilateralism and to start looking abroad for new ideas.  
At the same time, European regulatory capacity had increased considerably as a result 
of domestic institutional reforms and pan-European coordination and centralization of 
regulatory authority.  The picture captured by the “Kissinger Effect” gave way for a 
more symmetrical distribution of regulatory capacity.  The stage was thus set for an 
institutional shift in international market regulation, away from pure unilateralism and 
towards regulatory cooperation. 
 
In a dramatic reorientation, the FDA – over the span of just a few years in the early 
1990s – established an Office of International Affairs, signed Memorandums of 
Understanding with foreign regulators, and lifted restrictions on information sharing 
with foreign authorities.  Together with the European Commission, Japanese authorities, 
and various industry associations, the FDA launched the International Conference on 
Harmonization in 1991 to reduce friction in international pharmaceutical markets.  The 
agenda initially focused on information sharing and best practice development.  A major 
milestone was reached when the three parties agreed on a Common Technical 
Document (CTD).  The procedure, hailed as an “enormous achievement,” standardizes 
the documentation necessary to initiate the approval process in the three regions, though 
it does not harmonize the actual regulatory processes or requirements.
48 
 
Efforts to harmonize drug approval further have been less fruitful, especially because of 
FDA opposition.  As part of an effort to lower regulatory barriers to transatlantic trade, 
policymakers from the US and EU signed a Mutual Recognition Agreement in 1997 that 
included pharmaceuticals.  The MRA does not harmonized regulation.  Rather, the idea 
was to allow European regulators to certify on a case-by-case and ongoing basis that 
European exporters comply with US quality and safety standards, called Good 
Manufacturing Practices, and vice versa.  This would have eliminated the need for 
overseas inspections and dual filing of compliance documentation.  However, the FDA 
has largely failed to implement the accord and overseas inspections continue.  In return, 
European regulators acting on behalf of EMEA have expanded their inspections of US 
manufacturers seeking to export to Europe and, in the words of one executive, EMEA 
audits “tend to be much harder than FDA” domestic audits.
49 
 
Despite the failure to secure full mutual recognition, cooperation remains robust.  The 
FDA and European Commission now meet regularly under the 2005 Roadmap for 
Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation.  As a result, cooperation in some areas, such as 
scientific consultation in the field of biotechnology, is now firmly institutionalized.   
And lack of sweeping international deals does not mean there has not been convergence.  
Enhances direct and indirect exposure to its European counterparts has triggered some 
important substantive changes in FDA practices.  In 1992, for example, the US 
regulator copied the European model of charging for drug approval and channeling the 
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monies into expanded resources and speedier reviews.
50   Five years later, the FDA took 
another page out of Europe’s regulatory playbook when it authorized the use of third-
party assessment of drug safety. In short, while regulatory cooperation in 
pharmaceuticals remains limited, there has been a remarkable turnaround: what used to 
be a one-way street has given way to a more balanced situation of mutual learning and 
cooperation is increasingly displacing simple extraterritorial application of domestic 
rules.  Whereas realist and liberal arguments stressing market size and market friction 
struggle to account for this development, an assessment of the sequential development 
of regulatory capacity in key markets offers a compelling explanation. 
 
 
TRACING COSMETICS REGULATION 
International market regulation in the area of cosmetics lagged considerably behind 
pharmaceuticals.  Through the 1970s, most regulatory debates occurred at the national 
level with growing regional cooperation in Europe.  Since the 1980s, Europe has played 
the dominant position in international markets, defining laboratory best practices and 
exporting its regulatory model around the world.  Since the year 2000, there have been 
several initiatives to expand transgovernmental cooperation between regulators from the 
three major markets.  Despite these initiatives, the fundamental characteristics of 
international market regulation have remained unchanged: Europe wield’s tremendous 
regulatory influence and extra-territorial extensions of European law continue to be the 
principal source of international governance. 
 
Market Size 
An economic realist would expect European influence in international cosmetics 
governance to stem from its relative market size.  Convergence on the European model 
by Latin American and Asian markets could be explained through growth in the 
European market over the last decade and the associated “gravitational pull” that 
Drezner and others have highlighted.    
 
Actual market numbers present a mixed picture.  Western Europe has the largest single 
regional market for cosmetics with 29% of the global $270 billion market in 2006. 
North America, however, was close behind with 21%.  Both regions have seen their 
share of the world market fall since the late 1990s from 31% and 25% respectively.  
During this entire time, the United States has had the largest single national market.  
Japanese world market share has remained relatively constant at 11% since 2003.
51   
 
Turning closer attention to dynamic market changes, evidence does not point to rising 
European fortunes.  Recent sector growth is centered in Latin America and emerging 
economies in Asia and not in Western Europe or North America (where annual market 
growth rates were only 3% and 2% between 2001 and 2006).  While the United States, 
Japan, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy represented the six largest 
national markets in 2003, Brazil has surpassed France as the third largest and China has 
moved passed Italy to become the seventh largest market in 2006.
52   
 
Europe, then, is the current global market leader in cosmetics but does not enjoy the role 
of market hegemon as say the United States did in the financial services sector for much 
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of the 1980s and 1990s.  Market size cannot explain the vigor with which Europe has 
promoted its regulatory model compared to the relative absence of the US in similar 
global discussions.  Interestingly, the market size argument correctly predicts the 
relatively junior partner status that Japan plays.  The shift by China, Japan, and other 
large markets, however, toward the European regulatory approach in recent years is not 
clearly explained from shifts in relative market size. 
 
Market Frictions 
A second set of arguments focuses on the transaction costs associated with market 
interdependence.  Governments adjust their domestic regulations in order to minimize 
the frictions that arise from dissimilar rules.  One would expect high levels of 
cooperation between markets characterized by high levels of interdependence. 
 
Once again, market data does not clearly support the expectations of the liberal 
functionalist claims.  The European Union and the United States have long been net 
exporters of cosmetics and are each other’s largest export market.
53  In terms of foreign 
sales and asset dispersion, European and US firms are similarly integrated into world 
markets.  In 2003, over 20% of sales for the largest European and American cosmetics 
firms happened in each other’s markets and a similar percent of assets were located 
inter-regionally. These firms received roughly 17% of their sales in Japan, bringing 
foreign sales to roughly 40% of the total.  The Japanese sector is much less integrated 
into the global economy. Japanese companies control some 70% of their home market. 
In 2003, the largest Japanese firms were much more dependent on their domestic market 
with only 8% of sales coming from Europe and the United States combined and only 
13% of assets located in those other two regions.
54  Since the late 1990s, Japan was a 
net importer of cosmetics products and in recent years has found its exports to the 
European Union and the United States eclipsed by China. 
 
Given these economic patterns of interdependence with the United States and Europe 
highly integrated and Japan relatively independent it is surprising, at least from a liberal 
functionalist perspective, that the United States has shown the least interest in global 
cooperation.  The United States, which along with Europe has the most to gain from 
standardization, is the least active.  Similarly, the theory would not predict Japanese 
engagement in regulatory cooperation or its reform of its domestic regulatory system in 
line with European rules.   
 
Relative Efforts at Constructing Regulatory Capacity  
Transatlantic cosmetics markets exhibit an extensive “Kissinger Effect”, though in the 
opposite direction: whereas US regulatory capacity is fragmented and low, the EU 
boasts powerful regulatory state institutions and strong coordination at the EU-level.  
The institutional development of the regulatory state in the two largest cosmetics 
markets built very distinct regulatory legacies, which continue to shape international 
market regulation today.  In the US, the Food, Drugs and Cosmetics Act of 1938 
required that cosmetics be safe but it failed (with the exception of colorants) to provide 
the FDA with pre-market approval power.  Many consumer advocates criticize the lack 
of FDA oversight, noting that the agency has not defined “safety” for the sector.  It was 
not until 1976 that the Cosmetic, Toiletry & Fragrance Association organized the 
Cosmetics Ingredient Review as a voluntary, self-regulatory governance mechanism. 
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The FDA has in practice no formal authority to control market access and has 
comparatively little expertise in the issue, relying instead on industry-led ingredient 
review.  It is clear that the sector has a fragmented regulatory structure with limited 
government monitoring and enforcement.
55  
 
The European Union, by contrast, adopted formal regulation with clear lists of accepted, 
restricted, and prohibited ingredients with the passage of the Cosmetics directive in 
1976.  An early initiative of the internal market project, the directive aimed to guarantee 
the safety of these products, while facilitating the free exchange of such consumer 
goods within the European market.  The European Commission, specifically DG 
Enterprise, oversees the implementation of the directive.   
 
Over the following three decades, the EU has built its regulatory expertise and control 
over market access.  In terms of expertise, the EU founded the European Centre for the 
Validation of Alternative Methods (ECVAM) in 1991.  ECVAM studies alternatives to 
testing on animals and approves such procedures for use in the EU market.  In 1997, the 
European Union created the Scientific Committee on Cosmetic Products (this 
committee became the Scientific Committee on Consumer Products (SCCP) in 2004).   
Comprised of experts from the member states, the committee analyzes the safety of 
ingredients that should be placed on the various ingredients lists.  These 
recommendations are forwarded to the Commission, which decides which substances 
should be prohibited or restricted in the European market.  This network of scientific 
experts has greatly enhanced the level of expertise available to the Commission as it 
reviews individual products and the Centre for alternative testing provides the 
Commission with critical technical information.
56  
 
In terms of market access, successive reforms have expanded EU control.  Starting with 
the 6
th Amendment to the Cosmetics directive adopted in 1993, the EU prohibited the 
marketing of cosmetics that contained ingredients that had been tested on animals.  It 
requires firms to use alternative testing methods that do not involve animal subjects.  
The implementation of the prohibition was delayed twice so as to allow the 
development of such validation procedures.   
 
In 2003, the European Union adopted the 7
th Amendment to the directive, which further 
enhanced European regulatory capacity.  The Amendment extends the ban to include 
not only ingredients but also finished products that have been tested on animals and sets 
a final deadline for implementation of 2009.  This Amendment is monitored and 
implemented by ECVAM with oversight and coordination by the Commission.  The 7
th 
Amendment also enhanced the consumer protection aspects of the regime.  Most 
important, the reform significantly expanded the list of ingredients that were considered 
prohibited or restricted.  Substances containing category 1 and 2 carcinogens were 
placed on the list.  As a result, the number of prohibited ingredients has doubled to 




International ramifications of European reforms 
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The development of regulatory capacity has been central to the extraterritorial export of 
European rules.  In order to facilitate this modeling, the EU has conducted capacity 
building exercises in other countries.  The most intense of these efforts occurred 
between the EU and ASEAN, when the EU sent a group of technical experts to the 
region to help in their development of a cosmetics directive.  The effect of this capacity 
building is seen in the text of the directive adopted by ASEAN, which incorporates both 
the substantive list of banned substances in Europe with institutional features of the 
European regulatory regime.  The ASEAN directive creates an ASEAN Cosmetics 
Scientific Body, which has as one of its mandates the active review of developments in 
the European Union.  Since the adoption of the ASEAN directive in 2003, experts from 
Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and 
Vietnam have traveled to Europe for Commission sponsored trainings.  Minutes of the 
ASEAN Cosmetics Scientific Body routinely reference input from the European 
Commission and deference to its expertise.
58  Similar capacity building exercises have 
been conducted in Latin America, including meetings in Venezuela and Chile to 
promote its ingredient list system.    
 
The EU has also used its regulatory capacity to control market access to shape 
multinational corporations behavior.
59  Many MNCs have eliminated banned substances 
and are exploring alternative testing regimes.  In the US, the European regulations have 
spurred national animal rights and consumer safety lobbies to place additional pressure 
on cosmetics corporations.  In a well-publicized dispute, the Campaign for Safe 
Cosmetics, a US-based coalition of consumer and environmental groups, seized on the 
Europe-wide ban of phthalates in cosmetics to pressure leading cosmetics firms to 
voluntarily ban the substance in the US also.  After an aggressive advertising campaign, 
industry giants such as Revlon, Estée Lauder, and L'Oréal complied even though both 




While the lopsided distribution of regulatory capacity has structured international 
cosmetics regulation around EU dominance and extraterritorial promotion of EU rules, 
transgovernmental regulatory cooperation has taken hold in a specific subfield.   
Importantly, cooperation has succeeded in the one area where US policymakers 
managed to augment US regulatory capacity.  In response to European efforts on 
alternative testing, the US established an agency to oversee the scientific certification of 
such techniques, the US Interagency Coordinating Committee on the Validation of 
Alternative Methods (ICCVAM).
61  As the deadline for the first alternative-testing ban 
approached, regulators from four major markets – the EU, US, Japan, and Canada – sat 
down to resolve issues of regulatory conflict.  It is interesting to note that Health 
Canada, which has a long tradition in regulating cosmetics, was included in the 
transgovernmental process.  This seems to confirm the “Kissenger Effect” more than 
either of the other two theories as Canada is not a significant global cosmetics market.  
Similarly, the absence of China and Brazil (both with fledgling regulatory states) from 
the transgovernmental forum – labeled International Cooperation on Cosmetics 
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Regulation – in 2007 confirms the importance of domestic regulatory capacity for 
potential transgovernmental cooperation.  Additionally, the breakdown of previous 
transgovernmental cooperation in the form of the CHIC meetings supports the relative 
sequencing argument presented above as the FDA does not have regulatory capacity in 
the issue area but relies on industry self-regulation.
62  The failure to incorporate those 
industry representatives no doubt contributed to slow progress in cooperation.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The global pharmaceuticals and cosmetics markets have reached $700 billion in 
combined value, similar in size to the market for steel.  Despite the sectors’ size, their 
strategic importance at the intersection of manufacturing and cutting-edge, intellectual 
property-intensive research, and the many public health concerns tied up with the 
sectors’ regulation, IPE scholars have paid relatively little attention to their international 
governance.  This is mostly because existing analytic tools and theories struggle with 
governance that differs considerably from the conventional image of international 
cooperation.  Instead of typical interstate treaty organizations, international governance 
in these markets is provided through a mix of extraterritorial extensions of national law 
and network-based transgovernmental cooperation – safety standards, market access 
rules, and other non-tariff barriers have replaced formal trade agreements as the key 
focus of international public policy.  Governance patterns in international 
pharmaceutical- and cosmetics markets are not a quirky outlier.  Rather, they are 
examples of what we call international market regulation, the set of policy challenges 
and policy dynamics at the heart of integrating markets.     
 
Existing approaches encounter serious limitations when applied to international market 
regulation.  For sure, the realist focus on market size and liberal functionalists’ attention 
to underlying market friction and patterns of interdependence offer insights.  Realists 
are correct in their assertion that international market regulation is usually the domain of 
the largest and most powerful markets.  However, power cannot be reduced to market 
size.  We find instances where smaller markets can impose their preferences on larger 
ones.  Moreover, changes in relative market size do not correspond to shifting influence 
patterns within international regulatory regimes.  Similarly, liberals are correct that 
international market regulation is driven to a large extent by interdependence resulting 
from cross-border market integration.  Furthermore, efforts to reduce international 
market friction are clearly central to regulators’ international agenda.  But liberalism 
also falls short.  International efforts are not necessarily initiated by the most 
internationally oriented market.  In addition, liberalism cannot satisfactorily explain the 
emergence of transgovernmental cooperation alongside extraterritorial applications of 
national law or the changing locus of influence within international regulatory regimes.   
 
Making sense of policy dynamics inside international market regulation requires an 
analysis of domestic institutional development.  Globalization and market integration 
bring national regulatory structures that have evolved along distinct institutional 
trajectories into contact, and often into conflict with one another.  In the ensuing 
political dynamics, domestic regulators must balance the defense of existing national 
bargains with new demands arising from globalization.  Regulatory capacity is a critical 
variable in this respect.  Advanced economies have largely abandoned Keynesian 
demand management and politically-motivated monetary policy.  Deprived of these 
                                                 




earlier tools for economic management, governments now rely on a series of micro-
institutional structures to steer market competition in different sectors.  Globalization 
means that agencies and commissions created with an eye primarily to the domestic 
market are increasingly engaged in international market coordination and conflict 
management.  But not all agencies or regulatory systems are equal. We argue that 
differences in the relative development of regulatory capacity – what we call sequencing 
– is a principal driver in changing patterns of interaction in international market 
regulation.  Their institutional resources and capabilities vary greatly across countries, 
sectors, and time.  And this variation profoundly shapes international market regulation.    
 
The domestic institutional argument put forth in this article offers a corrective to 
existing work focused on market size or market friction and thus make an important 
contribution to the literature.  International market regulation features a different kind of 
politics, one in which domestic regulatory actors take on critical international roles.  
Regulatory capacity explains why and when sizeable markets become a source of 
international influence.  Similarly, it sheds light on who is likely to make the first move 
against the backdrop of market friction, who controls the policy agenda, and why and 
when extraterritorial application of nationals laws may give way to cooperation.  To be 
clear, the domestic institutional argument is not deterministic; it does not predict with 
complete certainty what will happen in a sector given the underlying distribution of 
regulatory capacity.  Rather, it is a probabilistic argument that highlights the critical role 
of domestic regulatory capacity and its sequential development for international market 
regulation. 
 
Beyond correcting shortcomings of arguments stressing market size or market friction, 
the paper makes two important contributions to the literature on international political 
economy.  In emphasizing the importance of sequencing and regulatory capacity, the 
paper sheds light on the conditions under which transgovernmental cooperation may 
occur.  Much of the bourgeoning literature on transgovernmental networks has focused 
on the pressures globalization has placed on the state to find new, fast and flexible 
governance solutions, and how such networks offer just that.  Less attention has been 
paid to the critical question when and where transgovernmental networks are likely to 
appear.  After all, we can only find them in a few areas and most have developed fairly 
recently.  This study suggests that sufficient regulatory capacity in leading markets is a 
pre-condition for transgovernmental cooperation.  Networks have to be anchored on 
solid domestic nodes.  Persistent institutional asymmetry – the “Kissinger Effect” – 
makes robust transgovernmental cooperation unlikely.  As regulatory state-type 
institutions spread across sectors and countries, we would expect transgovernmental 
cooperation to become more prevalent.  Yet it will never completely displace 
conventional interstate governance because many areas of economy and society remain 
under direct control of governments and elected officials, rather than independent 
regulatory agencies. 
 
Furthermore, the findings make an important contribution to the debate over product- 
and process standards in international market competition.  Scharpf put forth a 
compelling argument that has become conventional wisdom.  He urges governments to 
regulate domestic markets via product standards as these can more easily be linked to 
market access control and can thus be imposed on foreign imports.  Strict product 
standards in large, attractive markets can set off the “trading up” dynamic identified by 




competitive disadvantage as these are generally hard to impose on foreign producers.  
The pharmaceutical and cosmetics cases show that this is not universally so.   
Extraterritorial application of national law works via process standards.  The FDA, for 
example, required foreign producer to submit to the same grueling drug development 
and approval scheme that applied to US firms, as a condition for market access.  In both 
cases – the US in pharmaceuticals and Europe in cosmetics – the extraterritorial 
application of process standards has proven an effective tool to force foreign ratcheting 
up of regulation.  It is possible that these two cases are exceptions that prove the rule.  
Because of the nature of both industries, product safety is maintained via careful 
monitoring of the product development process.  More likely, however, Scharpf’s 
influential argument has to be conditioned.  In a range of sectors, from biotechnology to 
high value-added professional services, product- and process regulation are closely 
intertwined.  In cases where product safety is ensured via regulation of the production 
process, potent domestic regulators may in fact be able to force foreign ratcheting up via 
process standards.  Further research should probe this proposition.  
 
This conclusion highlights some of the intriguing areas for future inquiry.  International 
market regulation offers an ideal terrain to drive research on the interaction of 
domestic and international politics forward.  International market regulation unfolds 
transnationally, often below the radar of established international organizations and 
heads of government.  Instead, domestic regulatory agencies are the principal 
protagonists.  The stakes are nevertheless high as rules for multi-billion global 
industries affecting people all over the world take shape.  We are convinced that IPE 
scholars will pay more attention to international market regulation and historical 
institutionalism offers a robust and attractive analytic toolbox for the construction of 
future theories.   
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